The Secretary-General`s enterprise agreement was widely negotiated due to the increasing application by gaTT contracting parties of a large number of so-called “shadow zones” measures (voluntary bilateral export restrictions, ordered marketing agreements and similar measures) to limit imports of certain products. These measures were not imposed under Article XIX and are therefore not subject to the multilateral discipline of the GATT and the legality of these measures under the GATT was questionable. The agreement now clearly prohibits these measures and contains specific provisions to eliminate the measures in force when the WTO agreement came into force. In 2018, the IAEA has developed state-level approaches for five other countries, bringing the total number of countries with a comprehensive protection agreement and a state-level approach to 130. According to the IAEA in 2018, “these 130 states hold 97% of all (large-scale) nuclear materials in states that have entered into a comprehensive protection agreement under the Agency`s safeguards. The IAEA safeguards do not prohibit additional bilateral or multilateral safeguards. For example, in 1991, Brazil and Argentina concluded an agreement on bilateral security inspections (ABACC) and Euratom safeguards that preceded the NPT requirement and contribute to the protection agreements negotiated by their Member States with the Agency. Security agreements ensure that all nuclear activities carried out by a state serve peaceful purposes and that a state does not carry out illegal nuclear activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the independent body responsible for enforcing security measures. The five nuclear-weapon states of the nuclear non-proliferation reactor (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) are not required to enter into IAEA protection agreements under the non-proliferation regime. However, all five have signed voluntary offer guarantee agreements that allow the IAEA to apply protections for the equipment in selected eligible entities. This is the case with nuclear materials and civilian sites. The five nuclear-weapon States also signed additional protocols to the voluntary supply guarantee agreements.

Over the years, the IAEA has also developed the concept at the state level, which has become the name of an integrated approach to safeguarding. Under the state-level approach, the IAEA takes each state as a whole into account in the implementation and evaluation of security measures, including nuclear activities and nuclear capabilities, rather than conducting individual reviews of each facility in a given state. On the basis of a wider range of information, the Agency will then be able to implement a security approach in the country concerned. 2. (a) In cases where a quota is distributed among the supplier countries, the member applying the restrictions may seek agreement on the allocation of quota shares with all other members who have a considerable interest in delivering the product concerned. In cases where this method is not reasonably feasible, the member concerned shares members who have a core interest in providing the shares of the product on the basis of the shares of the product delivered by those members during a prior representative period of the total volume or total value of imports, taking into account all the particular factors that have or could affect the product`s trade. The five nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have entered into voluntary agreements on supply guarantees under which the IAEA applies safeguards for nuclear materials in facilities that the State has voluntarily proposed and has chosen the IAEA for the application of security measures. The IAEA applies safeguards as part of a voluntary offer agreement to ensure that nuclear materials remain in peaceful activities and are not removed from security measures, unless provided for in the agreement. Safeguards are being implemented in three non-NPT states – India, Pakistan and Israel – on the basis of one-off agreements with the